People's Summit for a Fossil Free Future

Santa Marta Conference: Analysis of Final Report from People’s Summit for a Fossil Fuel Free Future

Context

Before governments even sat down in Santa Marta, civil society had already set the terms of the conversation. Ahead of the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands in the coal port of Santa Marta from 24–29 April 2026, a global coalition of civil society organisations and social movements, frontline organisations, Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant communities, Feminists, Environmental, Youth and Workers from every region published the People's Declaration for a Rapid, Equitable, and Just Transition for a Fossil-Free Future: 15 principles across four clusters of demands covering fossil fuel phase-out timelines, renewable energy, financial system transformation, and systemic justice. It was not a wish list. It was a baseline. One that builds on decades of leadership, campaigns, movement building and justice-centred demands.

Read the full People's Declaration

The Santa Marta conference was a historic first: for decades, governments have failed to sufficiently address the threat of fossil fuels, and for the first time in history, an international conference broke the implementation deadlock and facilitated groundbreaking dialogue on the practicalities of implementing the transition away from fossil fuels. The co-hosts’ final report documents the outcomes and discussions of the conference, including a "Santa Marta Vision" of 10 points, 5 operational pathways, 3 ongoing workstreams, and a large body of stakeholder quotes and co-hosts’ summaries. It is the most substantial government-level document on fossil fuels to date, and our movement's fingerprints are all over it.

Read the Outcome Report

However, alarming gaps remain: demands to end fossil fuel expansion, militarism, and genocide-enabling fossil fuel exports and imports, as well as the need for corporate and Global North accountability, were raised loudly by many sectors, but largely remain absent from the co-hosts' report.

There is a notable gap between the positions of governments and the summaries of more powerful, science-aligned and justice-centred statements from civil society and many sectors, including Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Descendant communities, women and diversities, Environmental defenders, children and youth, and trade unions, who were consistently bolder than the governments that followed them.

Furthermore, there was a lack of transparency on which governments were invited – there was an open door to wealthy nations particuarly from Europe, despite centuries of fossil fuel production that has burnt through the carbon budget, yet Global South states showing transition leadership or leading discussions on economic system reforms and the need for scaled finance were excluded from the summit. Visa barriers, a lack of financial support and opaque participation mechanisms also limited attendence by many sectors from the Global South. In the outcomes, the Co-Hosts have also only established workstreams led by Global North institutions.

The Tuvalu Summit should redress this major political oversight and ensure that Global South governments, sectors, and institutions have a central seat at the table, helping to drive forward the conversation on a global just transition and to scale South-South cooperation.

ANALYSIS

The analysis below compares the Outcome Report to the demands of the People’s Declaration, and summarises where we moved governments, where they felt short and what needs to happen next year, in the Pacific, for the Second International to be a real major step towards a fossil-free future.

Where we moved governments

The conference report significantly addresses this demand from the People’s Declaration, and the ongoing Santa Marta Process has a concrete mandate to advance it – across 3 workstreams, 10-point Vision, 5 Pathways or “Action Elements”.

Each must now shift from dialogue to concrete action and implementation.

The People’s Declaration demanded coal phase-out for the Global North by 2030, gas and oil by early 2030s and 2040 respectively; and for the Global South by 2035–2050.
The principle of a differentiated and 1.5ºC aligned phase out is embedded in the report – the ongoing process must now support states to set concrete timelines for a phase out: coal phase-out for the Global North by 2030, gas and oil by early 2030s and 2040 respectively; and for the Global South by 2035–2050.
The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” was highlighted clearly in submissions (p. 76) and is defined as a “foundational principle of international environmental and climate Cooperation” by the co-hosts (p. 160). One of the “elements that appear with frequency” in the submissions and stakeholder meetings was "differentiated phase-out timelines" (p. 132). The principle that "countries with the greatest historical responsibility and highest levels of fossil fuel consumption should move first and fastest" (p. 106). The cross-cutting design principles for roadmaps include the directive to "incorporate differentiation based on national circumstances and acknowledge that countries have varying levels of fossil fuel dependence" and that “timelines, and support requirements for transitioning away from fossil fuels will differ and should be tailored to each country’s context.” (p. 87).
The co-hosts identify “predictable and differentiated phase-out timelines” as a key instrument for Pathway 4 on overcoming economic dependencies,
The report, and the Santa Marta Vision calls for roadmaps "aligned with 1.5°C" (p. 6) which is welcomed – and suggests that roadmaps should include “Clear phase-out dates for different fossil fuels” (p. 89) but does not specify dates for when coal, oil, or gas production must end for any country group (pp. 34–36). The emphasis on national roadmaps suggests an emphasis on bottom-up, self-differentiated commitments similar to NDCs, which makes the application or negotiation of a true equity framework challenging.
The ongoing process must now move from dialogue and principles to concrete, equitable, time-bound transition commitments. Many Global North states attending the summit do not have 1.5ºC-aligned phase-out dates in place, let alone equitable phase out timelines accounting for economic capacity and historic responsibility.
This is an area of strong convergence between the People’s Declaration and the outcome report, particuarly in Pathway 3 elements regarding science- and rights-based roadmaps for a socio-economic and energy transition and just workforce development.
This priority was communicated strongly by the majority of sectors. Trade Unions emphasised the need for "binding just transition plans; social protection; guaranteed retraining and income support; worker participation in decision-making" (p. 86). Academics urged governments to “proactively protect livelihoods and workers through early retraining, skills development” (p. 79). Parliamentarians “Develop labour reconversion strategies for workers in the fossil fuel industry” (p. 81). Social movements called for the transition to be “planned in dialogue with workers and communities, where retraining and economic reconversion are properly resourced, and where new productive alternatives are rooted in local economies rather than externally determined.” (p. 78)
The Pathway 3 action elements include "socio-economic and energy transition and just workforce development" as a core framing (p. 74). The report's Cross-Cutting Design Principles for roadmaps explicitly includes "ensure a just transition for workers and communities, including social protection, skills development and decent work" (p. 87) and call for the conceptual framework of roadmaps to “ensure that workers, communities, and territories have credible pathways toward new forms of economic activity, decent work, and long-term resilience” (p. 75). The co-hosts suggest that “Territorial just transition plans co-designed with workers” should be included in roadmap designs (p. 89)
This intention must now shift into tangible actions from governments.
This is probably the area of strongest convergence between the Declaration and the conference report. The Social Movements chapter stated that "the Social Movements Sector was united around a common objective: decentralised, community-owned renewable energy systems that guarantee equitable access and end energy poverty" (p. 100). Language on energy democracy and sovereignty appears across Trade Unions, Women & Diversities, Social Movements, Peasant Communities, Indigenous Peoples, and Afro-descendant sectoral inputs.
The cross-cutting roadmap principles include "strengthen energy sovereignty and energy democracy, while expanding reliable and affordable energy access" (p. 87). Pathway 3 Action 3.3 is dedicated to "access to clean energy for rural, remote and marginalized communities" (p. 97).
The cross-cutting design principles explicitly require roadmaps to be "rights-based and territorially grounded, protecting environmental leaders and expanding civic space, respecting free and prior consent for indigenous peoples, self-determination, community participation and environmental justice" (p. 87).
The Indigenous Peoples' sector called for "self-determination, territorial autonomy and land rights; FPIC, including the right to withhold consent" (p. 86). Women and Diversities called for “continueous consent, including free, prior and informed consent. (p. 81)
The Santa Marta Vision's Point 6 states the transition should not "create new forms of extractivism or dependence" (p. 35) and “Stronger multilateral governance for critical minerals and related supply chains, including the right of Indigenous Peoples on free, prior and informed consent” is named as an enabling condition to be considered in Workstream 1 on roadmaps.
Governments must now translate this dialogue into binding policies and mechanisms.
A Fossil Fuel Treaty was the most prominently supported proposals in the process, with many governments and 80% of sectors calling for an international framework to be negotiated.

The Declaration explicitly demanded negotiation of "an International Treaty on Fossil Fuels." This was one of the most actively discussed proposals through the whole conference process including submissions and dialogues. Trade Unions demanded "a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty" as a legally binding framework (p. 245). Subnational Governments called for "an inclusive fossil fuel treaty" to close governance gaps (p. 61). Vanuatu "urged that the coalition not be afraid of legally binding international frameworks and called for a fossil fuel treaty to be incorporated into governance structures" (p. 66). Women & Diversities "called for a fossil fuel treaty" and "immediate movement toward a legally binding framework" (p. 64).
The co-hosts specifically mention the proposal to “negotiate a new legally binding agreement to accelerate a fossil fuel phase-out” and identified "a potential dedicated instrument on fossil fuel" among the "various options named" (p. 67).
However, the three workstreams launched focus only on the two thematic tracks of the conference and do not advance the proposals from the third thematic track on closing gaps on global governance. Civil society calls on the incoming hosts to initiate a workstream explicitly focussed on the development of an international instrument to manage a fast, fair and financed transition away from fossil fuels and look to secure a negotiating mandate at the second conference.

Demand partially met by co-hosts

This demand was addressed briefly in the report, reflected in stakeholder quotes, and has the potential to be addressed in workstreams or pathways, but not comprehensively advanced by the Co-Hosts.

Concrete frameworks and policies to end expansion were explicitly suggested by many sectors, for example, academic stakeholders called for "a moratorium on new and expanded facilities” (p. 107). Trade Unions urged governments to “carry out a fundamental reform of the international framework to enable a just transition worldwide, and particularly in the Global South, one that is legally binding and subject to trade union oversight, starting with a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty” (p. 62).
The report also acknowledges that commonly recurring solutions in the virtual dialogues ahead of the conference included “legal moratoria on new licences” (p. 104) and that "new licences, fossil-fuel-free zones" were discussed in the technical roundtable on planned phase-down (p. 107).
While “halt the issuance of new licenses” and “moratoria on new licences” is mentioned as an instrument to enable for Pathway 3 on developing roadmaps, the co-hosts' own "Santa Marta Vision" — the ten-point framework that represents the conference's official outputs — contains no explicit commitment to halting new fossil fuel projects.
Many attending governments of the ‘coalition of the doers’ still have fossil fuel expansion plans.
The Declaration demanded cancellation of "unsustainable and illegitimate debts" and a UN Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt.
Sector inputs aligned with this position and several called explicitly for “debt cancellation for countries facing unsustainable debt burdens (p. 116): Trade Unions stated that “The Global North must assume its own reparative responsibilities by canceling the debt owed by the Global South” (p. 119); NGOs listed "debt relief and non-debt-creating climate finance" as a core demand (p. 86). Academics called for “extensive debt cancellation” (p. 118). Women and Diversities called for “debt cancellation, provision of highly-concessional, non-debt creating, public climate finance” (p. 120).
The report's Pathway 4 gives space to "fiscal dependence, debt constraints, limited fiscal space" as barriers (pp. 113–123). The co-hosts' action elements on this (Action 4.1) acknowledge "debt-for-transition swaps, debt restructuring and debt relief linked to transition investments" as instruments (p. 123), and call for "strengthened governance in international financial architecture" and "coordinated positions in IFIs and MDBs" (p. 122).
However, the co-hosts stop short of discussing debt cancellation and no mention of a UN sovereign debt framework or the establishment of a Debt Resolution Facility appears in the official output.
The Declaration demanded cancellation of ISDS agreements. This is one of the clearest moments of civil society pressure becoming visible in the governmental record.
The Center for Energy Policy Research “flagged ISDS as one of the biggest obstacles to the energy transition, calling for it to be included in discussions on the financial architecture, and proposed a state-led group on ISDS” (p. 65).
Civil society and the NGO sector called for addressing ISDS as "a barrier to equitable" transition (p. 276). Trade Unions called for “withdrawal from the ISDS system” (p. 149) and Parliamentarians explicitly named it as a barrier (p. 145). Academics proposed “establishment of a working group” to “collectively address ISDS as a barrier” (p. 148) and the Private Sector stated that ISDS caused “potential constraints on sovereign climate action, creating uncertainty and risk aversion” (p. 148)
Several participants in a technical roundtable during the High Level Segment mentioned that “ISDS-related legal barriers were major obstacles” to the transition (p. 149). However, this seems to be disputed by some, with the Co-Hosts Summary stating ISDS “which by some were perceived as creating barriers, while the extent to which these barriers are perceived varies.” (p. 150)
There is no co-host's action element explicitly calling for ISDS elimination. It remains a governance gap to be addressed, but is not explicitly addressed in the structure of a workstream.
The Declaration called for wealth taxes, windfall profit taxes, higher corporate rates, and an end to fossil fuel subsidies.
The conference gave significant attention to fossil fuel subsidy reform (Pathway 4, Action 4.3, pp. 131–137). The co-hosts' summary explicitly states that "fossil fuel subsidies and misaligned financial incentives continue to keep fossil fuels artificially competitive" and calls for "comprehensive subsidy inventories and disclosure frameworks" and "predictable and differentiated phase-out timelines" as instruments (p. 137). The Coalition on Phasing Out of Fossil Fuel Incentives Including Subsidies (COFFIS) is a named delivery actor.
The Declaration's broader tax justice agenda — tax havens, profit shifting, a UN Framework Convention on Tax Cooperation — is raised by stakeholders (Trade Unions, p. 119; Academics, p. 118) but does not appear in co-host action elements at all.
The Declaration demanded prohibition of "fossil fuel, Big Tech, and Geoengineering sponsorships, partnerships and consultancies" and exclusion of "fossil fuel lobbyists and other industry delegates" from the conference and subsequent processes.
The conference report notes that "a team of 1,415 volunteers who are expert volunteers in conflicts of interest and integrity in climate change processes" reviewed registrant lists and that "organisations with potential conflicts of interest were reviewed by the co-hosts, and where both agreed that a conflict existed the organisations were removed from the list" (pp. 39–40). The Pathway 1 conceptual framework includes "conflict of interest prevention: safeguarding the integrity of the process in all spaces for dialogue" (p. 38).
This is a meaningful effort – arguably the strongest multilateral effort to constrain the influence of the fossil fuel industry on an international conference in history. However, the scope and outcome of the screening process are not fully disclosed, there was a lack of transparency over participation guardrails in the Private Sector process, and the Declaration's call for a formal prohibition in future processes has not been institutionalised.
The ongoing process could strengthen limits on industry influence, drawing on lessons from the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).
The Declaration demanded explicit recognition of the care economy and feminist redistribution of care work. The Women & Diversities chapter outcome called for "recognition of the care economy as a strategic low-carbon sector; gender-responsive transition finance; women's leadership and participation in decision-making" (p. 86). The Women & Diversities chapter also stated: "It is fundamental to establish strong national and global policies that open up fiscal space towards social protections... and the reduction of military spending" (p. 119).
The cross-cutting roadmap principles include "advance intergenerational, gender, racial and climate justice as core objectives of the transition" (p. 87).
The co-hosts' action elements mention gender equity in participation and leadership as a design principle (p. 38) and the roadmap principles reference gender justice (p. 87). However, no dedicated action element addresses the care economy, and the feminist systemic framing of the Declaration — care as an unpaid subsidy to neoliberal economics — does not appear in co-host summaries.
The People’s Declaration sets out detailed standards for transition minerals governance.
The co-hosts report records that "civil society organisations ... pointed to risks of growing demand for critical minerals, hydrogen, bioenergy and other transition-related commodities ... These stakeholders emphasised the importance of free, prior and informed consent, territorial autonomy, community-led decision-making, local value addition and stronger environmental and human rights safeguards across supply chains" (pp. 91–92).
The roadmap cross-cutting principles include "promote economic diversification and value creation, avoiding new forms of extractivism and low-value-added dependence" (p. 87) yet there is no dedicated action element on transition minerals, no "no-go zones" language, and no binding minerals governance framework. This is noted as a gap by stakeholders.

Mentioned strongly by sectors, insufficiently addressed by governments or hosts

This demand was mentioned in the synthesis of stakeholder positions or quoted as raised by Sectors, but not mentioned or actioned at a governmental level and not advanced explicitly by the co-hosts in the outcomes.

Sectoral contributions called for "stronger mechanisms to ensure remediation of environmental liabilities, restoration of ecosystems, reparations for affected communities" and stated that "fossil fuel companies should assume responsibility for remediation and restoration" (p. 106). The Trade Unions chapter demanded "multinationals and mining companies ensure that their closure and withdrawal processes are fair, participatory and locally focused, guaranteeing full redress" (p. 107).
Co-host summaries on phase-down acknowledge "management of environmental liabilities" as necessary (p. 104) but do not advance efforts to create any accountability mechanism for corporations, and no action element advances establishing binding obligations on the fossil fuel industry.
This demand is explicitly raised by Sectors and notably contested by governments. The report notes that "some also questioned the role of technologies and approaches perceived as delaying fossil fuel phase-out—including carbon capture and storage, geoengineering, certain carbon market mechanisms and other 'false solutions'—arguing that priority should be given to absolute emissions reductions" (p. 92).
Indigenous Peoples stated that "the transition must focus on leaving fossil fuels in the ground, rather than relying on offset mechanisms that commodify nature" (p. 106) and urged “rejection of false solutions that undermine Indigenous rights” (p. 86). The NGO Sector “called for a strong global architecture that excludes false solutions, the negotiation of a fossil fuel treaty” (p. 63).
The conceptual framework of Pathway 1 includes "solutions-oriented approach: prioritising measures that significantly support the transition, avoiding false solutions or delays" (p. 38) but is not explicit about which ‘false solutions’ it refers to.
There is no distinct action or pathway related to false solutions. Concerningly, the co-hosts' vision and action elements do not explicitly exclude carbon markets, CCS, or nuclear. Most concerningly, the report records "differing views on the role of transitional fuels and technologies" – terminology often used to try to justify fossil gas expansion and production – as an area of active disagreement (p. 93).
The report mentions that sectors referred to “the emerging role of international law in safeguarding the rights of present and future generations, including the Advisory Opinions on States´obligations in the context of climate change by the International Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights and other international tribunals”.
The Youth Sector specifically argued that a “managed phase-down should be understood as an obligation to future generations rather than a discretionary political choice” and Parliamentarians called for “alignment with international obligations and treaties.”
The People's Declaration's conclusion itself cited the ICJ Opinion as confirming "binding obligations on States to address the climate crisis" — an argument that did not surface in the official conference framing.
Concerningly, the ICJ Advisory Opinion does not appear in the co-hosts' action elements or the Santa Marta Vision. Governments did not frame phasing out fossil fuels as a legal obligation that must be met.
The Declaration devoted its entire Section II to capitalism, colonialism, racism, and ecological debt, arguing that climate finance is reparations, not aid.
The report's sectoral inputs includes Trade Unions calling for the Global North to "assume its reparative responsibilities by cancelling the debt owed by the Global South" (p. 119); Social Movements calling for "material reparations on extractive companies" (p. 270); and NGOs recognising "ecological debt and loss and damage" (p. 86). The Indigenous Peoples chapter (p. 262) called for "reparation measures when applicable in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples."
The co-hosts' own framing references the need for "non-debt-creating finance" and "concessional" support, but does not use the language of reparations, ecological debt, or historical responsibility.
Analysis of colonialism and capitalism as root causes is wholly absent from the governmental outputs.
The People’s Declaration called for "transitioning away from fossil-fuel-dependent industrial animal agriculture" and prioritising "localized, animal-free ecofarming models." The Social Movements chapter mentioned "food sovereignty" and the Women & Diversities chapter raised "food sovereignty, water security, territorial resilience and the reduction of energy poverty" (p. 92) as themes that should integrate with energy planning. Peasant Communities "emphasized the importance of prioritizing water, biodiversity and food production as forms of 'vital energy'" (p. 99).
Food systems and industrial agriculture do not appear in the co-hosts' five pathways, workstreams, or action elements.

Ignored by co-hosts

Alarmingly, this demand was entirely absent from the Co-Hosts’ report.

The Women & Diversities chapter demanded governments "close existing loopholes in fossil fuel governance frameworks that allow fossil fuels to be used to further genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity" at the high-level segment (p. 255) and Trade Unions “demand a ban on energy exports that fuel genocide, wars and other crimes” (p. 145)
There is no corresponding language in the co-hosts' summaries, action elements, or the Santa Marta Vision. The Declaration's explicit framing around Palestine, US-Israel imperialism, and colonial occupation is entirely absent from governmental outputs.
The People’s Declaration explicitly excluded nuclear, waste incineration, industrial biofuels, and large-scale hydro from acceptable clean energy.
The report notes that “Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant communities, women-led organizations, peasant movements, youth and NGOs expressed concern that growing demand for critical minerals, hydrogen, bioenergy and other transition-related commodities could generate new sacrifice zones” (p. 92)
Concerningly, the outcomes do not exclude any specific technologies – and the report mentions that “there were different perspectives on the role of transitional fuels and technologies” – framing often used to justify fossil gas expansion (p. 95). The report mentions no explicit discussion of nuclear, large-scale biofuels or destructive hydro.
The Declaration devoted Principle Twelve to the links between militarism, fossil fuel dependence, and climate breakdown.
The Women & Diversities chapter called for the “reduction of military spending” (p. 120) and “critical reallocation of public resources away from fossil-fuel-based and militarized sectors and towards stronger social protections and care-based sectors” (p. 135). This is the only direct mention of the demand across sectors and governments in the report.
The conference report contains no analysis of military emissions, no discussion of redirecting military budgets, and no reference to wars or geopolitical aggression as a driver of the energy crisis. The Declaration's entire framing around US-Israel imperialism is entirely absent from the conference record.
The cross-cutting design principles explicitly require roadmaps to be "rights-based and territorially grounded, protecting environmental leaders and expanding civic space, respecting free and prior consent for indigenous peoples, self-determination, community participation and environmental justice" (p. 87).
The Indigenous Peoples' sector called for "self-determination, territorial autonomy and land rights; FPIC, including the right to withhold consent" (p. 86). Women and Diversities called for “continueous consent, including free, prior and informed consent. (p. 81)
The Santa Marta Vision's Point 6 states the transition should not "create new forms of extractivism or dependence" (p. 35) and “Stronger multilateral governance for critical minerals and related supply chains, including the right of Indigenous Peoples on free, prior and informed consent” is named as an enabling condition to be considered in Workstream 1 on roadmaps.
Governments must now translate this dialogue into binding policies and mechanisms.
The People’s Declaration's 15th Principle called for dismantling "corporate power and impunity, including their hold over politics" and demanded a binding Treaty on Transnational Corporations.
Some sectors mentioned corporate accountability – Social Movements demanded "strong corporate accountability" and "transition strategies led by communities rather than externally imposed models" (p. 86). The academic workstreams called for "a legally binding treaty on business [and human rights]" (p. 295).
The Declaration's structural critique, that capitalism itself is the root cause, and the demand for a Treaty on Transnational Corporations are entirely absent from co-host outputs. The conference explicitly positioned itself as a "coalition of doers" that combines public and private actors, with the Private Sector as one of stakeholder chapters with equal status at the table as rights-holders.

What must happen now towards Tuvalu 2027

Throughout the report, civil society's language is bolder and more specific than the co-hosts' conclusions, and many of the elements discussed are not explicitly advanced in the Pathways or Workstreams. Stakeholder quotes call for cancellation, moratoria, and binding obligations; the co-hosts’ own summaries consistently soften those calls into “barriers to consider" or “options” to explore. The report separates what stakeholders said from what governments discussed, and even further from the ongoing process.

In summary, our words are on the record, but not yet our victories.

For civil society, this is a mixed legacy: our demands are on the record in ways they have never been before in any multilateral process, but we are not here just to be heard — we are here to secure action and protect life from the threat of fossil fuels.

Santa Marta proved that governments can no longer avoid this conversation.

Tuvalu 2027 must prove governments can meet our vision, one grounded in science and justice – not just with dialogue, rhetoric and documents, but with concrete policies and new multilateral frameworks to manage the transition. This is why:

Roadmaps must carry real dates and finance: principles on differentiation must become explicit phase-out years for coal, oil and gas, by country grouping, with wealthy countries that have used up the carbon budget through historical emissions going sooner and providing finance to those that need support to transition.

A negotiating mandate for a Fossil Fuel Treaty: governments must translate their commitment to international cooperation and shared concern about global governance gaps into urgent collaboration to establish a mandate for a new international instrument among states ready to transition.

Debt cancellation, tax justice and an ISDS shift must graduate from "barriers" raised in dialogue to ongoing efforts to develop concrete international cooperation and action that also actively promote and facilitate economic diversification in countries of the Global South where such dependence exists.

Dangerous distractions must be named and excluded – particularly the potential for gas expansion – not left as "differing views."

The linkages between militarism, imperialism and genocide-enabling fossil fuel exports and imports must be front and centre of the process, particularly if states that are rapidly expanding military expenditure yet claiming to not be able to afford a transition are at the table

Corporate and Global North accountability must be addressed and entered into the official record at the second conference, with clear and transparent conflict-of-interest criteria for participation, stronger guardrails, and transparency measures to limit the fossil fuel industry and other corporate vested interests from exerting undue influence on the process.